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Legal historians believe that the Romans based the existence and use of rights on three broad 
general categories, which were utilized to include and exclude human beings. These divisions 
defined a person’s legal condition and what the subjects could do, what they could own, what they 
could attempt to achieve, in what they could succeed, and to what they could be submitted1. 
The legal terminology that is most frequently used to define these categories is status, which means 
condition or situation. Concerning the ius Quiritium, full legal subjects were only those men who 
benefitted from a position of privilege in terms of their status personae, which was tested by three 
different questions. First, the status libertatis investigated whether the person was free, a slave or a 
libertus. Second, the status civitatis queried whether he/she was a Roman citizen or a foreigner or 
“almost Roman”. Finally, the status familiae addressed questions regarding whether a man is a 
pater familias or a man or woman is sui iuris or alieni iuri subiectus. All three categories involve a 
type of conflict that relates to the logical antithesis between the people who are “inside” or 
“outside” and the natural opposition between the people who are interested in making the fence 
strong and eternal and the people who, on the contrary, would like to trespass or destroy it2. 
To analyse the genesis and historical development of these categories, as well as the nature of the 
conflict that they create, we should attempt to comprehend if and in which way they were 
effectively understood, accepted and barred in actual life by real people who lived for over a 
millennium in the vast ancient Roman Empire. The question arises whether these categories were 
created only for the use and benefit of a small ruling élite, i.e., the Italian aristocracy, or whether 
through centuries they also formed part of the culture of the large masses of provinciales, i.e., the 
multiform peoples of Mauritania, Gallia, Egypt, and Germania. These people’s destiny was to enjoy 
the pax Romana, with its connected benefits and limits, after they had lived through a variety of 
military and political events in the limes – and it remains uncertain whether they were happy about 
this3. 
The answer to the above question appears to be simple regarding the status libertatis and status 
familiae, although for opposite reasons. 
It is well known that all ancient peoples without exception practiced various forms of personal 
enslavement, which divided all human beings on the basis of Gaius’ summa division, between liberi 
and servi (Inst. 1.9-12). Although we know that the forms of coercion an owner could use on an 
enslaved subject differed widely in place and time, to be enslaved in ancient Israel was 
unquestionably a lesser evil than to be enslaved in ancient Greece or Rome. In the time of Crassus, 
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the slave’s position was far worse than in the time of Hadrian or Marcus Aurelius4. In the ancient 
world, everyone understood what it meant to be a slave and would do everything possible to avoid 
this fate. There may have been some exceptions because Plautus wrote that some slaves begged 
their dominus not to free them and abandon them on the road without home, job and assistance.  
It is widely believed that the institute of patria potestas belonged exclusively to the Roman 
tradition5. Patria potestas originated during very ancient times because the pater familias, the head 
of the family, was attributed the role of religious mediator between the world of the living and the 
world of the dead in the interest of the familia, which was considered, as Franco Casavola has said, 
an "isola sacra", a sacred island6. Gaius has proudly emphasized that no other ancient people but the 
Romans knew this or any similar institution or had ever any interest in following it (Inst. 1.55).  
For many centuries, only a small part of the population of the Roman Empire built their lives, as 
individuals and as organized communities, on the strong supremacy of the pater familias. Not only 
was the pater familias the owner of the patrimonial property and the holder of subjective rights, he 
was also the only person who was authorized to exercise power over the individuals under his 
authority. Pater familias could include filii familias of fifty or sixty years old, and they may be 
fathers or grandfathers and consuls or senators; their most extensive powers included an arbitrary 
ius vitae ac necis 7. 
For several centuries, the patria potestas generated a hidden, fierce conflict between patres and filii 
familias, which reflected the dark “prohibited dream” of the sons to violently overthrow the 
supremacy of the despot in contrast to the "fear of the fathers". Connected to this conflict was the 
cruel supplicium singulare of the poena cullei. This punishment was set for the son who was 
convicted of murdering his own father, and he was condemned to die by drowning in a horrible 
animal tangle by being sewn in a sack with a dog, viper, cock and monkey, whose characteristics 
were all present in him8.  
However, sons could often obtain significant advantages and benefits from their condition. In 
contrast, the high number of emancipationes demonstrates that many fathers frequently wanted to 
free themselves from this heavy burden. However, most of the inhabitants of the empire were not 
concerned with patria potestas and many of them likely did not know what it meant. No citizen of 
Syria, Iberia or Britannia would ever desire to become a pater familias.  
The status civitatis is more complicated because it is not easy to define if, how, when, to what 
degree, and for which persons or peoples the achievement of the condition of civis Romanus could 
be a goal that involved real privileges.  
Many sources depict an image of civitas Romana in a rhetorical and propagandistic manner as a 
condition of superiority, completion and perfection on the civil, cultural and legal levels. This status 
was progressively and incrementally extended – sometimes passing through the middle status of 
Latinitas – to increasingly larger groups of foreigners, peregrini and barbari to allow them to enjoy 
the Roman felicitas until the ecumenical donation of Antoninus Caracalla. The so-called constitutio 
Antoniniana of 212 A.D. generously extended citizenship to all inhabitants of the empire9. 
However, there are actually no truthful indications that the peregrini always strived to achieve the 
deeply desired goal of the civitas Romana. It is more realistic that the ancient sources give us an 
absolute and untrue picture through an abstract and timeless representation. Without exact frames of 
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time and space, some specific problems of legal capacity and private autonomy have been described 
and generalized. These problems relate to the acquisition of property and the formation of contracts, 
which originated and existed only in specific contexts and particular historical times. 
 As a political problem with wide-ranging implications, the civitas question would become 
prominent for the first time when the libera res publica was under threat. Thus, during the bellum 
sociale of 90-89 B.C., the leges de civitate, the lex Iulia de civitate Latinis et sociis danda of 90 
B.C. and the Plautia Papiria of 89 B.C. were rapidly promulgated and extended the civitas to the 
socii who had not raised arms against Rome. Subsequently, a specific quaestio extraordinaria de 
civitate was established in 65 B.C., which was charged to judge the crimen of usurpatio civitatis. 
However, the real causes of the war appear not to have been the simple request by the Italian allies 
of Rome to be granted civitas, because it seems that on the contrary, many of the socii were openly 
opposed to this inclusion10. Moreover, it is a fact that the quaestio de civitate seldom sat; we know 
the famous defence by Cicero of the poet Archia, who was accused of usurpatio civitatis in 
violation of the lex Plautia Papiria, but we do not have many other sources concerning this field. 
Thus, when during the last century of the republic, the problems of ownership and the extension of 
citizenship were addressed by juridical and political regulation, these questions had already lost 
much of their importance11.  
Not much later, the great battle between the West and the East would be decided – on the one side 
the republican, secular, pluralist and polytheistic tradition and on the other side the autocratic, 
absolute and mystic models of power; the government of Rome would become the government of 
the world. In the new, ambiguous system of the principatus, the prince was the preserver of the 
republic and at the same time, as Antoninus Pius said, also "toù kòsmou kyrios", the lord of the 
universe12. In addition, as Giorgio Luraschi explained13, in this new world, relevance was no longer 
situated in the inclusion in or exclusion from an abstract concept of civitas Romana. Relevance 
involved the level of civilization, autonomy, and institutional strength that was conquered and 
defended by the various nations and regions, and the thousands of civitates, coloniae, pòleis, 
municipia of the Roman world were the deciding factor.  
Arnaldo Momigliano has written that the question of citizenship may well be considered the "royal 
road" in understanding the history of Rome14. However, primarily, municipal citizenship was the 
most important factor, and the history of the Roman Empire is overall the history of a multitude of 
local citizenships. This situation does not mean that the civitas Romana, as status personae, had no 
significance; it was very relevant, for example, in criminal prosecutions, because only Roman 
citizens could provocare ad Caesarem against the capital sentences of local tribunals. Saint Paul 
used this possibility, although without success15, but Jesus did not have this opportunity if he would 
have wanted to use it16. However, concerning the possession and exercise of civil rights and 
political and economic power, citizenship had little importance. Many inhabitants of the empire 
were not concerned at all regarding the kind gift of Antoninus Caracalla; many people were 
probably unaware of it, whereas many others viewed it as a 'promotion' from a citizen of their own 
nation to a subject of Rome. 
A century later, another, more important, event would determine a definitive change in the history 
of the ancient world and, concomitantly, in the history of citizenship. After the victory of 
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Christianity, which was related to the definitive strengthening of the empire as a monarchic and 
absolute institution, the unique emperor, in the name of the unique God, would address a unique 
people: the people of God17. The words of Saint Paul, the apostle of the gentiles, that there would 
exist "no free man and no slave, no Roman and no Greek, but only brothers in Christ" (Gal. 3.28), 
did not admit any citizenship but that which belonged to the civitas Dei of Saint Augustin. 
The civitas Romana becomes in this way the civitas Christiana, which was no longer regulated by 
rules of voluntary inclusion and exclusion but rather by forced and compulsory inclusion18. This 
forced inclusion involved a total and violent de-legitimation of all individuals who – for whatever 
reason and resolve – were in a position of antagonism, distance, and irregularity regarding this new 
universal category. New types of conflict were also generated, which would be much stronger and 
more enduring than the conflicts regarding the previous problems concerning citizenship. These 
conflicts raged for many centuries against these "different citizens." In this category, pagans were 
obstinate citizens of a past world who were destined to a quick dissolution. Heretics were dangerous 
holders of an evil "virus" of "false citizenship". Jews were the citizens sui generis of a glorious but 
lost world whose function had ended with the arrival of the Messiah. Jewish citizens were in 
eternity and without distinction completely guilty for not having recognized the son of God and for 
having put him to death19. 
The Roman civitas was never based on an evaluation of the conscience. The sole defender of the 
ancient values of the Roman civitas and a proud and lonely voice against the new idea of absolute 
and compulsory citizenship was the pagan senator Symmachus, who declared at the end of the 
fourth century: "suus cuique mos, suus ritus est" (Rel. 3.10). However, very few heard and followed 
this philosophy. A new rule was adopted regarding the new "strangers". This rule was derived from 
the parable of the banquet that was found in the gospel of Luke, namely, "compelle eos intrare" 




The essay tries to explain what was the meaning and the function of the three broad categories (the 
so called status: familia, civitas, libertas), which were built in the Roman antiquity and were 
utilized to include and exclude human beings, defining the person’s legal condition and what the 
subjects could do, what they could own, what they could attempt to achieve, in what they could 
succeed, and to what they could be submitted.   
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